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Abstract 
 
The rise in unsecured lending has cast doubt on the effectiveness of the National Credit Act in South 
Africa. Reckless lending was seen rising since 2006 and plateauing in 2009.  Could this be evidence of 
the effectiveness of the National Credit Act (NCA) curbing reckless lending household debts? This 
study embarks on finding whether reckless lending was present in the Pre-NCA period running from 
1994 to the end of 2nd quarter of 2007 when the NCA was enacted. Further in this study, the 
effectiveness of NCA in curbing reckless lending in the Post-NCA period starting from the 3rd quarter 
of 2007 to the 2nd quarter of 2014. Using the Johansen Cointegration analysis and Vector Error 
Correction Model, long run and short run Granger causality tests are done with the household debt as 
a dependent and debt service coverage ratio, household debt to disposable income ratio and disposable 
income as independents. The results from the tests done provide convincing evidence that reckless 
lending indeed was present in the Pre-NCA period and there is evidence showing the curbing of 
reckless lending in the Post-NCA period. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There has been a gradual rise in unsecured lending in 
the credit markets of South Africa. This has been 
precipitated by the restrictions to reckless lending 
which were brought about by the introduction of the 
National Credit Act (NCA) 34 of 2005 in South 
Africa. The National Credit regulator who is 
mandated to administrate and implement the NCA 
indicates that the total outstanding gross debtors’ 
book of consumer credit for the quarter ended June 
2014 was R1.57 trillion. Apparently, mortgages have 
the largest portion of this gross debtor’s book of 
53.18% followed by secured credit agreements at 
21.69%, credit facilities at 12.44%, unsecured lending 
at 10.98%, with developmental credit at 1.66% and 
short-term credit at 0.04% (Consumer Credit Market 
Report, 2nd Quarter report, 2014) However concern 
has been expressed on how unsecured lending has 
been on the rise as reported by Angilique Arde in the 
Independent Online newspaper of 25 March 2012: 
‘’Half of South Africa’s consumers who use 
credit have impaired credit records and every month 
about 6 000 consumers apply for debt counselling. 
Over the past year (2011), there has been a 53-percent 
growth in unsecured lending.’ 
It has been observed in legal and government 
sectors that South Africa’s insolvency legislation is in 
adequate in combating overspending and over-
indebtedness. Renke (2011) asserts that the Usury Act 
– that was in effect for many years - was not enough 
as legal regulator of consumer credit markets before 
its eventual repeal by South Africa’s newest piece of 
consumer credit legislation, the National Credit Act. 
In conjuction to this, Roestoff and Renke (2003) 
seem to agree with the findings by the Technical 
Committee, Credit Law review (2003) on how the 
Usury Act did not protect consumers from over-
indebtedness through reckless credit granting by 
credit providers. 
Three instances are given as reckless lending in 
the National Credit Act. Firstly, in the instance where 
the credit provider fails to conduct an assessment as 
required by the Act, despite the outcome of the 
unauthorized credit assessment might have concluded 
at the time. Secondly, where the credit provider, 
conducts credit assessment, and proceeds to conclude 
a credit agreement with the consumer regardless of 
the fact that the information available to the credit 
provider indicates that the  consumer does not 
generally understand or appreciate the consumer‘s 
risks, costs or obligations under the proposed credit 
agreement. The third instance is where the credit 
provider, having conducted an assessment, concludes 
a credit agreement with the consumer in spite of the 
fact that the information available to the credit 
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provider indicates that entering into that credit 
agreement would make the consumer over indebted. 
However the regulators (NCA) and the South 
African Reserve Bank (SARB) believe the National 
Credit Act is doing well in constraining the imprudent 
credit provision which leads to consumer 
indebtedness. The South African Banks non-
performing loans to total gross loans decreased 
gradually from 3.1% in 2001 to 1.1% in 2006 which 
was at its lowest and peaking to 5.9% 2009 as shown 
in Figure 1. The sharp decline can be attributed to the 
enactment of the National Credit Act in 2007 whose 
set up and rolling out started in 2004. The Credit 
Bureau Monitor (2014:Q2) and the SARB Quarterly 
bulletin (2014:Q3) however gave a contrasting 
scenario to the level of Household indebtedness in 
South Africa, with the SARB indicating that the 
household debt to income was at 73,5% as of 2014 
second quarter compared to its highest of 76.3% in 
2012, second quarter. On the other hand the Credit 
Bureau monitor report also indicated a decline in 
household with more than 3 months in arrears 
declining from 18.7% in September 2011 to 28.3% in 
June 2014. Prinsloo (2002) indicates that the 
spending and saving behaviour is determined by a 
number of factors such as material and social needs, 
tradition, standard of living, existing indebtedness, 
net worth and disposable income. With this brief 
background and a mixed signal of the statistics on 
household indebtedness, especially around the period 
of NCA enactment, there is a need of analysing the 
extent of how reckless lending has been contained by 
implementing the consumer protection law (NCA). 
Furthermore, Figure 1 shows how the non-performing 
loans increased during the period the NCA was 
enacted – from 2007 to 2009. This situation therefore 
raises the need to find out if reckless lending has been 
curtailed by the new consumer credit regulation or 
not. 
 
 
Figure 1. South African Banks Non-Performing Loans to Total Gross Loans 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank -International Monetary Fund Database (2014) 
 
The research was conducted to statistically 
prove whether the National Credit Act has been 
successful in combating reckless lending and 
particularly to what degree can it be ascertained that 
indeed the NCA has managed to curb reckless 
lending. The main emphasis was to look at two 
periods which are divided by the enactment of this 
NCA that is from 1994 to 2007 and from 2007 to 
2014. The main idea was to find out if the household 
data of disposable income, household debt, debt 
service coverage ratio and household debt to income 
ratio can tell us anything about the success of the 
NCA in combating imprudent credit provision to 
consumers in South Africa. The next section 
discusses the literature on the theory of household 
indebtedness and empirical studies that have been 
done on issues relating to household indebtedness. 
Following this, a description of the data, the research 
methodology used for analysing the data, the results 
are presented, followed by a discussion of the results. 
Then finally the implications, contributions of the 
research and the conclusions are done. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Definition of Reckless Lending 
 
An exploration of given legal terms of unfair lending 
practices being reckless lending is done by Porteous 
(2009). The terms looked at are reckless lending (as 
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stipulated in the South African National Credit Act 
(NCA) of 2005); predatory lending (as defined by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (DFIC), 2006) 
and Consumer Credit Act in the UK termed an unfair 
relationship between lender and borrower. It is further 
asserted that reckless lending and predatory lending 
insinuate various meanings of unfair credit lending 
practices and this gives rise to generalization of the 
terms reckless lending and predatory lending in such 
a way that it is difficult to enforce legally. This gives 
rise to the inability of identifying and enforcing 
reckless lending, especially when households do not 
give complete and correct information during the 
credit decision making time. Such undeclared 
information is prevalent at household and personal 
levels leading to unclear creditworthiness in these 
sectors. Pottow (2007) adds another dimension of 
how to understand the problem of reckless lending, 
especially in the USA context, by insinuating the 
need to link debt to bankruptcy filing. The filing for 
bankruptcy in USA is equivalent to the South African 
declaration of insolvency and the use of the debt 
counselling facility as provided under the NCA to be 
rehabilitated out of debt.  In order to avoid the 
regurgitation of explanations and meaning of the 
following terms household debt, disposable income 
and household indebtedness being used in this 
research, inference from economic and banking 
literature, especially the microeconomics of the 
household is made.  
 
2.2 Causes of Household Over-
Indebtedness 
 
There is need to understand the definitions of 
household indebtedness and household over-
indebtedness and their links to reckless lending. 
D’alessio and Iezzi (2013) define household 
indebtedness in light of the life-cycle-permanent 
income theory which stipulates how households at 
early stages of life incur debt in anticipation of 
paying it in the future with assumed improvement in 
income. Conversely the households spurred by this 
assumption spend more than they can earn leading to 
household indebtedness. However the European 
Union Commission report (2007) on EU Household 
Indebtedness indicates the difficulty of defining and 
measuring household indebtedness given differing 
socio-economic contexts and legislation across the 
European continent.  
Betti et.al (2007) in their study indicate that 
over-indebtedness is exhibited by a wide array of 
indicators which include debt to income ratio, rate of 
loan delinquencies and number of households self-
reporting to be in arrears. This shows how wide and 
subjective household indebtedness can be defined as 
shown in the literature (Kempson (2002), Keese 
(2009), Lusardi and Tufarno (2009.)). From the 
literature it is clear that over-indebtedness and 
indebtedness is loosely used interchangeably. This 
issue might cause problems in finding the right proxy 
for household indebtedness. In conjunction to this, 
Keese (2009) links irresponsible lending – which in 
our case can be referred to as impudent or reckless 
lending – to causing indebtedness. A working 
definition for over-indebtedness is given by Disney 
et.al. (2008) as the state of a consumer falling into 
arrears on at least one credit obligation. However 
Schicks (2013) illustrates the meaning of over-
indebtedness in light of consumer protection which 
differs from the definitions given by authors cited 
above. Furthermore Schicks illustrates a 
comprehensive overview of how over- indebtedness 
is defined in consumer finance and microfinance 
literature depending on the type of research being 
done as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Dimensions of Defining Over-indebtedness 
 
Type of 
Choice 
Dimension of Choice Categories 
1. Purpose Scientific Lens Legal Economic Sociological Other 
Precision Definition Indicator Proxy  
Reference Unit Individual Household Network of Kin Aggregate 
2. Method Composition Single Criterion Multiple criteria   
Scale Quantitative Qualitative   
Perspective Objective Subjective   
Data Source External Self Reported   
3. Severity Time Horizon Current Structural Permanent  
Debt Condition Bankruptcy Default Arrears Imbalance 
Role of the borrower Innocent Unintended Deliberate
1
  
Level of sacrifice To minimum 
existence level 
More than 
expected 
Liquidity buffer
2
 No sacrifice 
1 
For example, Strategic default or fraud  
2
 Inability to meet expenses 
 
Source: Adopted from Schicks (2010) 
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Schicks summarized a comprehensive view of 
the factors that lead to over-indebtedness as shown in 
Figure 3, though based on empirical literature of 
micro-finance it shares similarities with the reviewed 
literature above. As illustrated in figure 3, the 
interaction of lender behaviour, borrower behaviour 
and external factors chiefly determines the over-
indebtedness of the borrower. 
 
Figure 3. The Drivers of over indebtedness 
 
 
 
Source: Adopted from Schicks (2010) 
 
Dynan and Kohn (2007) argue that the main 
causes of a dramatic rise in USA household over- 
indebtedness are linked to the dramatic drop in 
household savings. They further show, through 
simple household behaviour models, how – 
empirically- changes in tastes, interest rates, and 
households’ expected incomes do not appear to have 
materially increased household debt. However, they 
assert that demographic shifts partly clarify the run-
up in debt. The rise in house prices, though not 
exclusive, can cause increased household debt, and 
the house price increases usually is the main driver of 
household debt increases. This notion is evidenced by 
the National Credit Regulator’s statistics on the 
consumer credit market in South Africa which shows 
that house mortgage has a larger share of the gross 
debtors book (Consumer Credit Report, 2014:Q2)). 
In another study, Ezeoha (2011) shows that - 
through an empirical study of Nigerian banks from 
2004 to 2008- reckless lending was fuelled by excess 
liquidity and relatively huge capital bases. Further it 
is asserted that increased levels of unsecured lending 
in banks portfolios albeit aided the mitigation of non-
performing loans within the studied period through 
the application of stringent measures. One of the 
significant outcomes of this study is that, a regulation 
induced industry consolidation in Nigeria was 
indicated as a cause for heightened incidences of non-
performing loans. It was going to be better if the 
study investigated human induced factors that could 
cause the high loan delinquency and more so question 
the effectiveness of the credit regulation. South 
African banks currently are incurring a huge increase 
in unsecured lending and this could be traced to the 
National Credit Act by the supposition that banks are 
now innovating credit products that can smartly 
outclass the stringent requirements of this act.  
Through a quantitative model, Sanchez (2008) 
highlights how the revolution of I.T managed to 
reduce information costs in lending to households but 
contrary increasing bankruptcy by 40%. Within the 
same conjecture, Levitin (2009) indicated how 
financial innovation in the USA retail financial 
services did churn ‘negative innovations,’ which were 
evidenced in vague pricing, including billing tricks 
and traps that encourage unsafe lending practices. 
Thus financial innovation also seem to have 
considerably contributed to increased household debt, 
but not in the sense of increasing the share of 
households that are able to borrow but instead 
increasing the amount of debt of households that 
already had some access to borrowing.  
Hussain (2002) explores the reasons for the 
remarkable rise in personal bankruptcies in UK since 
1999. The study used a robust regression analysis 
model which proved that increased indebtedness 
leads to more bankruptcies. From the econometric 
analysis it is concluded that there are two ways by 
which indebtedness affects bankruptcies. Firstly 
increased indebtedness causes high debt and this 
External Factors 
 Adverse Shocks 
 Institutional 
environment (e.g. 
macroeconomic or 
legal) 
Lender Behaviour 
 Marketing and growth 
focus 
 Inflexible products 
 Unfair lending 
procedures/collections 
Borrower behaviour 
 Cognitive and 
psychological biases 
 Sociological influences 
 Socio-
demographic/economic 
attributes 
Over-Indebtedness 
as a consequence of 
interacting factors 
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reduces the household ability to borrow more and 
thus exposing them to adverse economic shocks. 
Secondly, the debt to income ratio is a good indicator 
of the credit quality of the borrowers. Therefore given 
a financial liberalized environment a high debt to 
income ratio indicates a shifting of the credit limits to 
accord credit to the households that could not afford 
it. Other authors attest to these findings (Rinaldi and 
Sanchis-Arellano (2006), Dygan-Bump and Grant 
(2009), Livshits et.al (2007). 
The dimensions of over-indebtedness are varied 
in the spectrum of demographics. Therefore there are 
many perspectives of defining indebtedness. The 
literature above has clearly shown that household 
indebtedness is a good balance of the household 
expenses, debt and income whilst the over-
indebtedness is bad balance of these variables. The 
main causes - as gleaned from literature - of over-
indebtedness are improper regulation of credit 
markets, life cycle aspects of the household, financial 
innovation that circumvents robust credit regulation, 
unsecured lending and adverse economic conditions. 
This section clearly articulates the sources of 
household over-indebtedness and therefore it will be 
prudent to have a view of the consumer credit 
protection laws internationally and particularly in 
South Africa. 
 
2.3 Consumer Credit Protection Laws – 
an International and South African 
Perspective 
 
Rossouw (2008) in her study indicates that the South 
African’s National Credit Act has been influenced by 
Canadian, Australian and British historical behaviour 
regarding reckless lending and over indebtedness. 
The evidence presented to back this is based on the 
similarities of South Africa’s lending history to that 
of Australia in terms of the causes of increased 
household debt due to increased consumer credit, 
which are increased credit lending rate, high and 
unregulated lending in the informal credit markets 
and general reckless lending behaviour in the credit 
markets. The other evidence presented was the 
similarity of consumer protection laws in South 
Africa to that of Canada, Australia and Britian in 
curbing reckless lending. Additionally Rossouw 
concluded from the investigation that the NCA was 
effective in protecting the households from reckless 
lending through capped interest rates and lending 
based on affordability especially during the period of 
the global economic downturn in 2007 – 2008. The 
same notion is supported by the Finmark Trust Report 
done by Pearson and Greef (2006) which indicated 
that price control on loan products was only adequate 
accompanied by regulation of imprudent lending 
practices. Pearson and Greef depict credit regulation 
into three pillars by tabling a crosswise comparison of 
these three pillars as presented in Table 1. The first 
column concerns the assessment of clients’ ability to 
repay, second pillar is about the divulging of all credit 
costs and the third pillar refers to interest rate caps or 
usury laws. It can be observed that the South African 
NCA meets all the three criteria for an adequate 
credit law which offers protection against reckless 
lending.
 
Table 1. Credit Laws of Various Countries 
 
 Pillar I Pillar II Pillar III 
France 
 APRC includes all costs 
and has to be published. 
A loan is stated as usury when the rate exceeds the 
average effective rate of the prior quarter 
(published by the Bank of France) by one third. 
Germany 
 APRC
1
 includes all costs 
and has to be published. 
If the APR is double the market interest rate and 
there has been abuse of an exigency, inexperience, 
lack of judgment or substantial weak will, the 
interest rate is illegal according to court orders. 
Switzerland 
Attachable income has to 
be high enough to pay 
back the credit within 36 
months. 
APRC includes all costs. Interest cap usually fixed below 15 % per annum. 
United 
Kingdom 
 APRC includes all costs 
and has to be published. 
Usurious credit agreements can be reopened by 
court. 
United 
States 
 APR includes all costs 
according to the Federal 
Truth and Lending Law 
Different regulations in every state. 
South Africa 
National Credit Act 
requires lender to assess 
the client’s ability to pay. 
All costs must be 
disclosed in terms of the 
National Credit Act and 
Regulations. 
Regulations provide for maximum rates of interest 
applicable to seven different types of credit. 
Source: Finmark Trust (Pearson and Greef, 2006) 
                                                          
1 APRC – Annual Percentage Rate of Change 
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It can be seen from Table 1 that the emphasis of 
the consumer credit protection laws internationally is 
the need to ensure that households are given credit 
that they can afford to pay back, are not overcharged 
on interest payments and that all loan costs should be 
transparent to avoid over-indebtedness. In such a case 
anything that deviates from this is deemed reckless 
lending.  
Conclusively the literature reports the presence 
of consumer credit law that inhibits reckless lending. 
However to the best of our knowledge there are no 
studies that prove their effectiveness and try to link 
indebtedness to inadequate credit regulation 
quantitatively. For the case of South Africa most of 
the studies are a mere attempt, by legal experts in 
their studies, to prove how the new NCA managed to 
curb reckless lending and this is done qualitatively 
(Stoop, 2009, Otto, 2008). However since lending has 
also a quantitative aspects we devise a statistical 
model to test the impact of the NCA in curbing 
reckless lending. The need to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the NCA after its implementation is 
necessary as posed by Brix and Mackee (2010). Thus 
the following section describes the research methods 
employed to achieve the purpose of this research, 
namely to find the effectiveness of the NCA in 
curbing reckless lending in South Africa and results 
thereof are also presented and discussed. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
Secondary data was obtained from the South African 
Reserve Bank economics statistics database. 
Quarterly time series data ranging from 1994:1 to 
2014:3 was used. The model specification and 
assumptions are presented in the next section. 
 
3.1 Model Specification 
 
The research methods constituted the use of the 
Johansen Co-integration System test  and the Vector 
Error Correction Model for long and short run 
equilibrium tests among the variables chosen to 
measure the impact of the National Credit Act on 
household debt. Econometric tests are performed and 
applied on the time series data which is split into two 
periods: 
1. From 1994:1 to 2007:2 (Before the 
enactment of the NCA) to determine the relationship 
between household debt, household savings, 
household disposable income and debt service costs.   
2. From 2007:3 to 2014:3 (after the Enactment 
of the NCA) to determine the relationship between 
household debt, household savings, household 
disposable income and debt service costs.   
In order to test the relationships amongst the 
variables the following model is constructed: 
 
 
𝛥𝐻𝐻𝑑 = 𝑓(𝐻𝐻𝑑 , 𝐻𝐻𝑌 , 𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑌, 𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑌) (1) 
 
Where: 
HHd is the household debt 
HHy is the household disposable income 
HHdY is the ratio of household debt to 
household disposable income 
DSCY is the ratio of debt service ratio to 
household disposable income 
The collected data to these variables are logged 
for analysis. 
 
3.2 Johansen Co-integration Technique 
 
In this section the technique that will be used to test 
co-integration for long run as well as short run 
relationships for the multivariate equation will be 
explained. This technique was formulated by 
Johansen (1988) and later amplified by Johansen and 
Juselius (1990).  
An assumption is made of three variables Wt, Xt 
and Yt which can all be endogenous. Using matrix 
notation represented by Zt= ( Wt, Xt and Yt) the 
following equation is proposed: 
 
𝑍𝑡 = 𝐴1𝑍𝑡−1 + 𝐴2𝑍𝑡−2 + ⋯ + 𝐴𝑘𝑍𝑡−𝑘 + 𝑢𝑡 (2) 
 
It can be reformulated into a vector error 
correction model (VECM) as follows: 
 
Δ𝑍𝑡 = Γ1Δ𝑍𝑡−1 + Γ2Δ𝑍𝑡−2 + ⋯ + Γ𝑘−1Δ𝑍𝑡−𝑘
+ Π𝑍𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡 
(3) 
 
Where: 
 
Γ𝑖 = (𝐼 − 𝐴1 − 𝐴2 − ⋯ − 𝐴𝑘)(𝐼 = 1,2, … 𝑘 − 1) 𝑎𝑛𝑑  
Π = −(𝐼 − (𝐼 − 𝐴1 − 𝐴2 − ⋯ − 𝐴𝑘) 
 
In this example there is need to examine the 3 Χ 
3 Π matrix (the Π matrix is 3 Χ 3 due to the fact that 
we assume three variables in Zt = (Wt, Xt and Yt) The 
Π matrix contains information regarding the long run 
relationship. In fact Π = aβ’ where a will include the 
speed of adjustment to equilibrium coefficients while 
β’ will be the long run matrix of coefficients. 
Therefore the β’Zt-1 term is equivalent to the 
error correction term (Yt-1 – β0 – β1 Xt-1) in the single 
equation case, except that now β’Zt-1 contains up to (n 
– 1) vectors in a multivariate framework. 
For simplicity we assume that k = 1, so that we 
have only two lagged terms and the model is then the 
following: 
 
[
Δ𝑊𝑡
Δ𝑋𝑡
Δ𝑌𝑡
] = Γ𝑖 [
Δ𝑊𝑡−1
Δ𝑋𝑡−1
Δ𝑌𝑡−1
] + Π [
𝑊𝑡−1
𝑋𝑡−1
𝑌𝑡−1
] + 𝜀𝑡 
 
Or  
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[
Δ𝑊𝑡
Δ𝑋𝑡
Δ𝑌𝑡
] = Γ𝑖 [
Δ𝑊𝑡−1
Δ𝑋𝑡−1
Δ𝑌𝑡−1
] + [
𝑎11 𝑎12
𝑎21 𝑎22
𝑎31 𝑎32
] [
𝛽11 𝛽21 𝛽31
𝛽12 𝛽22 𝛽32
] [
𝑊𝑡−1
𝑋𝑡−1
𝑌𝑡−1
] + 𝜀𝑡 (4) 
 
For the sake of expediency, we analyse the error 
correction part of the first equation (that is for ∆Wt on 
the left hand side) which gives; 
 
Π1𝑍𝑡−1 = ([𝑎11𝛽11 + 𝑎12𝛽12][𝑎11𝛽21 + 𝑎12𝛽22] × [𝑎11𝛽31 + 𝑎12𝛽32] [
𝑊𝑡−1
𝑋𝑡−1
𝑌𝑡−1
]) (5) 
 
Where, Π1 is the first row of the Π matrix. The 
above equation can be rewritten as; 
 
Π1𝑍𝑡−1 = 𝑎11(𝛽11𝑊𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑋𝑡−1+𝛽13𝑌𝑡−1) + 𝑎12(𝛽32𝑊𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑋𝑡−1+𝛽22𝑌𝑡−1) (6) 
 
Which shows clearly the co-integrating vectors 
with their respective speed of adjustment terms 
𝑎11 and 𝑎12 
In order to get reliable results the study follows 
procedures as per Johansen (1988) and Johansen and 
Juselius (1990) which are listed below.  
1. For the application of Johansen Co-
integration approach, all time series variables used in 
this study should be integrated of order one [I(1)].  
2. At second step, lag length would be chosen 
using VAR model on the basis of minimum values of 
Final Predication Error (FPE), Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC), and Hannan and Quinn information 
criterion (HQ).  
3. At third step, appropriate model regarding 
the deterministic components in the multivariate 
system are to be opted.  
4. Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius 
(1990) examine two methods for determining the 
number of co-integrating relations and both involve 
estimation of the matrix Π. Maximal eigenvalue 
statistics and trace statistic are utilized in fourth step 
for number of co-integrating relationships and also 
for the values of coefficients and standard errors 
regarding econometric model. 
 
3.3. Vector Error Correction Mode 
(VECM) 
 
A vector error correction model is a restricted vector 
autoregressive (VAR) designed for use with non-
stationary series that are known to be co-integrated. It 
may be tested for co-integration using an estimated 
VAR object. The VECM has co-integration relations 
built into the specification so that it restricts the long 
run behaviour of the endogenous variables to 
converge to their co-integrating relationships while 
allowing for short run adjustment dynamics. The co-
integration term is known as the error correction term 
(speed of adjustment) since the deviation from long 
run equilibrium is corrected gradually through a 
series of partial short run adjustments. The Short run 
equations are given below; 
 
∆𝐻𝐻𝑑 =  𝑎0 + ∑ 𝑎1∆𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1
+ ∑ 𝑎2∆𝐻𝐻𝑦𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=0
+ ∑ 𝑎3∆𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑌𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=0
+ + ∑ 𝑎4∆𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑌𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1
+ Ψ1𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝜀1𝑡 
 
(7) 
∆𝐻𝐻𝑦 =  𝑎0 + ∑ 𝑎1∆𝐻𝐻𝑦𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1
+ ∑ 𝑎2∆𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=0
+ ∑ 𝑎3∆𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑌𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=0
+ + ∑ 𝑎4∆𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑌𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1
+ Ψ1𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝜀1𝑡 (8) 
∆𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑌 =  𝑎0 + ∑ 𝑎1∆𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑌𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1
+ ∑ 𝑎2∆𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=0
+ ∑ 𝑎3∆𝐻𝐻𝑦𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=0
+ + ∑ 𝑎4∆𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑌𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1
+ Ψ1𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝜀1𝑡 (9) 
∆𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑌 =  𝑎0 + ∑ 𝑎1∆𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑌𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1
+ ∑ 𝑎2∆𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=0
+ ∑ 𝑎3∆𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑌𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=0
+ + ∑ 𝑎4∆𝐻𝐻𝑦𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1
+ Ψ1𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝜀1𝑡 (10) 
 
Where, ∆ is difference operator, p is chosen lag 
length, a’s are parameters, Ψ is error correction term 
or speed of adjustment term (calculated from long run 
results) and 𝜀 is error term with mean zero. VECM 
equations (7) to (10) state that ∆HHD, ∆DSCY, 
∆HHdY and ∆HHY depend on their own lagged 
value, other variables’ lagged value and also on the 
equilibrium error term. Since Ψ1ECTt-1 is negative 
and therefore ∆HHD, ∆DSCY, ∆HHdY and ∆HHY 
should be negative in order to restore the long-run 
equilibrium. That is, ∆HHD, ∆DSCY, ∆HHdY and 
∆HHY are above their equilibrium value, they will 
start falling in the next period to correct the 
equilibrium error. In the same way, if ECTt-1 is 
negative (that is, ∆HHD, ∆DSCY, ∆HHdY and 
∆HHY are below equilibrium value), Ψ1ECTt-1 will 
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be positive which will cause ∆HHDt, ∆DSCYt, 
∆HHdYt and ∆HHYt to rise in period t-j. Thus, the 
absolute value of Ψ1 decides how quickly the 
equilibrium is restored. 
 
4. Empirical Results and Discussions 
 
In this section the results of the outlined methodology 
in section 3 are presented and the implications of the 
results are also discussed. 
 
4.1. Unit Root Tests 
 
For reliability and validity, the data was logged and 
unit root tests were done using both the Dick – Fuller 
and the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests with results 
being presented in Table 2. After having the evidence 
of unit roots which shows an integration of order one 
–I (1) which implies modelling the data in first 
difference ((∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡−1) to make it stationary. 
A time series data is deemed stationary if it has 
constant variability over time and this prevent issues 
of spurious regressions associated with non-stationary 
time series models. All variables mostly attained 
stationary at first and second differences except for 
LDSCY in the Pre-NCA period which was stationary 
at level and non-stationary at first difference. 
However in the Post-NCA period all variables are 
stationary at first and second difference with LHHD 
being stationary at level. 
 
Table 2. ADF Unit Root Test Results (logged data) 
 
Variables 
Pre-NCA (1994/1 to 2007/2) 
Level First Difference Second Difference 
Intercept Trend and Intercept Intercept Trend and Intercept Intercept Trend and Intercept 
LDSCY -3.946781*** -11.57490*** -1.722718 -2.220921 -12.25801*** -12.23886*** 
LHHd -1.904262 -2.453687 -3.954897*** -3.918184*** -7.976003*** -7.890602*** 
LHHdY -1.543681 1.030742 -1.170330 -6.521751*** -8.000371*** -7.982396*** 
LHHY -0.121739 -1.918340 -12.96469*** -12.74364*** -10.24191*** -10.23369*** 
 Post NCA (2007/3 to 2014/4)  
 Level First Difference Second Difference 
Variables Intercept Trend and Intercept Intercept Trend and Intercept Intercept Trend and Intercept 
LDSCY -0.672233 -1.190176 -3.028674*** -3.058459 -3.599363*** -3.689278*** 
LHHd -1.585104 -3.944707*** -3.471231*** -3.567081** -7.964502*** -7.831252*** 
LHHdY 0.155862 -2.462281 -4.287991*** -4.170944*** -6.575564*** -6.420915*** 
LHHY -0.042906 -2.231937 -12.61529*** -12.27152*** -5.334261*** -5.411293*** 
 
Note: *, **, *** shows critical values at 10, 5 and 1 percent level of significance respectively 
 
4.2. Lag Length Selection Process 
 
Second step of Johansen Co-integration technique 
involves the selection of appropriate lag length using 
proper information criterions. The results are reported 
in table 3. Favourable lag length that is selected in 
current analysis is assumed to be 4 at most for the 
variables in the Pre-NCA period. The lag length for 
the variables in the Post –NCA period is indicated as 
4 but we have used 3 lags since these proved to be 
more optimum for our analysis. 
 
Table 3. Lag Length (Pre NCA and Post NCA) 
 
Pre-NCA Period 
 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 164.1705 NA 1.70e-08 -6.537569 -6.383135 -6.478977 
1 463.9134 538.3138 1.59e-13 -18.11891 -17.34674* -17.82595 
2 490.6192 43.60131 1.04e-13 -18.55588 -17.16597 -18.02855* 
3 501.1786 15.51598 1.35e-13 -18.33382 -16.32618 -17.57212 
4 533.5494 42.28018* 7.41e-14* -19.00202* -16.37663 -18.00595 
5 542.5374 10.27196 1.11e-13 -18.71581 -15.47269 -17.48538 
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Post - NCA Period  
 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 152.0907 NA 5.14e-11 -12.34089 -12.14455 -12.28880 
1 269.6508 186.1369 1.11e-14 -20.80424 -19.82253 -20.54379 
2 296.0068 32.94494 5.33e-15 -21.66723 -19.90015 -21.19843 
3 335.1015 35.83681 1.12e-15 -23.59179 -21.03934 -22.91463 
4 386.3434 29.89109* 1.44e-16* -26.52861* -23.19079* -25.64309* 
 
indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level) 
 FPE: Final prediction error 
 AIC: Akaike information criterion 
 SC: Schwarz information criterion 
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
 
4.3. Co-integration Test Results 
 
The third step of the Johansen Co-integration 
technique involves finding the number of co-
integrated equations using trace statistics and 
maximum eigenvalue statistics. The probabilities 
given in tables 4 and 5, indicate that null hypothesis 
is not rejected since there is more than 1 co-integrated 
equations. In table 4 for the Pre-NCA period the trace 
statistics and maximum eigenvalue statistics both 
show that there is one (1) cointegrating equation 
among the variables in the Pre-NCA period and at 
most two (2) cointegrating equations amongst the 
variables in the Post-NCA period. Since the aim of 
the study is to find whether the National Credit Act 
had an impact on Household debt, this test should 
determine whether household debt (HHd), debt 
service coverage to disposable income (DSCY), 
household debt to disposable income (HHdY) and 
household disposable income (HHY) share common 
long run relationship(s). The test results of the 
Johansen cointegration (trace statistics and maximum 
eigen values) test results shown in table 4 and 5  
show that there is one or more conitergrating vectors 
(error terms) in the model, therefore there exists a 
long run relationship among the variables. The 
acceptance or rejection of null hypothesis follows the 
p-value of each test statistic. If the p-value is less than 
5%, the null hypothesis is rejected and when the p-
value is more than 5% then the null hypothesis will 
not be rejected or we accept the null hypothesis. From 
the trace and maximum eigenvalue test results it is 
evident that we reject the null hypothesis and 
conclude that there is a long run relationship among 
the variables both in the Pre-NCA and Post-NCA 
period.
 
Table 4. Pre-NCA Period – Co-integration results 
 
Pre-NCA period - Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
None * 0.536157 59.73162 47.85613 0.0026 
At most 1 0.237523 22.08934 29.79707 0.2936 
At most 2 0.164127 8.801391 15.49471 0.3841 
At most 3 0.000341 0.016722 3.841466 0.8970 
Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level  
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
   
Pre-NCA period - Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
None * 0.536157 37.64229 27.58434 0.0018 
At most 1 0.237523 13.28795 21.13162 0.4261 
At most 2 0.164127 8.784669 14.26460 0.3045 
At most 3 0.000341 0.016722 3.841466 0.8970 
Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
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Table 5. Post NCA Period – Cointegration results 
 
Post NCA Period - Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
None * 0.955009 117.8694 47.85613 0.0000 
At most 1 * 0.746323 43.43853 29.79707 0.0008 
At most 2 0.354408 10.51791 15.49471 0.2430 
At most 3 0.000659 0.015814 3.841466 0.8998 
 Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
 
Post NCA Period - Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
None * 0.955009 74.43091 27.58434 0.0000 
At most 1 * 0.746323 32.92062 21.13162 0.0007 
At most 2 0.354408 10.50210 14.26460 0.1810 
At most 3 0.000659 0.015814 3.841466 0.8998 
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
 
4.4. Vector Error Correction Model 
(Short and Long run Results)  
 
With evidence of co-integration found among the 
variables the next step is to augment the Johansen 
Co-integration tests with the Granger-type causality 
test model with a one period lagged error correction 
term (ECT). These causality testing procedures are 
done within the VECM framework proposed by 
Engle and Granger (1987). In this case the residuals 
from co-integration model equilibrium regression can 
be used to estimate the Vector Error Correction 
Model (VECM). Then the F-Test or WALD of the 
explanatory variables (in the first difference) are run 
for the short run causal effects. The long run causal 
relationships are derived through the significance of 
the lagged ECT which contains the long run co-
integration. The Johansen co-integration test is not 
enough to describe fully the type of long-run and 
short-run causality relationships that exist among the 
variables. Therefore the Vector Error Correction 
Model causality test is done to capture both long-run 
and short-run relationships among the variables. The 
short-run causality is done through the WALD Chi-
sqaure test because of its ability to show the extent of 
the strength of causality among the variables. The 
VECM based short-run and long-run Granger 
causality tests are presented in Table 6 and 7. The 
null hypothesis is the assertion that there is no causal 
relationship between tested variables and the 
alternative hypothesis is that there is a causal 
relationship between tested variables. This applies for 
both short run and long run tests. 
The results from the vector error correction 
based causality test indicate in the short run a uni-
directional causality in the Pre-NCA period (Table 
6a) and bi-directional causality in the Post-NCA 
period (Table 6b) from household debt (LHHD) to 
household income (LHHY) which is significant at 
5%. Thus the hypotheses that, (1) household debt 
does not granger cause household income and (2) 
household income does not granger cause household 
debt, is rejected. Therefore in the context of this 
study, the Pre-NCA period Household debt would 
increase disposable income but disposable income 
would not increase or decrease household debt, a 
clear sign that income was not a determinant for 
one’s credit or loan affordability. However in the 
Post-NCA period there is a bi-directional relationship 
between household debt and disposable income, 
meaning that the debt taken by households was 
determined by the disposable income they have and 
more so the debt they have determines their 
disposable income. This is also a clear sign that the 
affordability rule put in the National Credit Act is 
working. 
The other interesting result is of the relationship 
between the debt service coverage to disposable 
income ratio (LDSCY) and disposable income to 
household debt (LHHdY) both in the Pre-NCA and 
Post NCA periods. In the Pre-NCA period the 
relationship is uni-directional and in the Post-NCA it 
is non – existing. The implications are that in the Pre-
NCA period, without stringent credit regulations, the 
more the household paid up their loans or debts the 
more they qualify for more debt, even though their 
disposable income is not increasing, since their 
household debt to disposable income ratio would 
improve indicating the ability to borrow more. 
However in the Post-NCA period in the short run 
there is no relationship between the improvements in 
the household debt service coverage to disposable 
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income ratio (LDSCY) and the household debt to 
disposable income ratio (LHHdY). The household’s 
debt service coverage to disposable income ratio 
would not necessarily improve the household’s debt 
to disposable income ratio. This is a clear indication 
of the maximum amount of money a household can 
afford given their disposable income curtailing the 
taking on of more debt rather than the ability to repay 
being a factor increasing the debt amount. The rule is 
that not more than R120,000 can be given as 
unsecured debt for individuals. 
 
 
Table 6. Short Run Causality Test results 
 
Pre-NCA Period 
Null Hypothesis Number of lags Wald Test Decision 
LHHD does not granger cause LDSCY 4 
2.003201 
(0.7352) 
Do not reject null hypothesis 
LHHD does not granger cause LHHdY 4 
4.720298 
(0.3172) 
Do not reject null hypothesis 
LHHD does not granger cause LHHY 4 
25.07499 
(0.0008***) 
Reject null hypothesis 
LDSCY  does not granger cause LHHD 4 
4.254020 
0.3727 
Do not reject null hypothesis 
LDSCY  does not granger cause LHHdY 4 
9.237129 
(0.0554**) 
Reject null hypothesis 
LDSCY  does not granger cause LHHY 4 
3.558611 
(0.4817) 
Do not reject null hypothesis 
LHHdY does not granger cause LHHD 4 
0.838661 
(0.933)2 
Do not reject null hypothesis 
LHHdY does not granger cause LDSCY 4 
0.766642 
(0.9429) 
Do not reject null hypothesis 
LHHdY does not granger cause LHHY 4 
2.481270 
(0.6480) 
Do not reject null hypothesis 
LHHY does not granger cause LHHD 4 
6.768270 
(0.1487) 
Do not reject null hypothesis 
LHHY does not granger cause LDSCY 4 
1.574302 
(0.8134) 
Do not reject null hypothesis 
LHHY does not granger cause LHHdY 4 
9.083738 
(0.0590**) 
Reject null hypothesis 
Post-NCA Period 
Null Hypothesis Number of lags Wald Test Decision 
LHHD does not granger cause LDSCY 3 
4.586270 
(0.2047) 
Do not reject null hypothesis 
LHHD does not granger cause LHHdY 3 
4.249473 
(0.2358) 
Do not reject null hypothesis 
LHHD does not granger cause LHHY 3 
39.48234 
(0.0000***) 
Reject null hypothesis 
LDSCY  does not granger cause LHHD 3 
0.183626 
(0.9802) 
Do not reject null hypothesis 
LDSCY  does not granger cause LHHdY 3 
14.33698 
(0.0025) 
Do not reject null hypothesis 
LDSCY  does not granger cause LHHY 3 
5.292136 
0.1516 
Do not reject null hypothesis 
LHHdY does not granger cause LHHD 3 
5.934572 
(0.1148) 
Do not reject null hypothesis 
LHHdY does not granger cause LDSCY 3 
3.8752361 
(0.2752) 
Do not reject null hypothesis 
LHHdY does not granger cause LHHY 3 
6.518552 
(0.0889***) 
Reject null hypothesis 
LHHY does not granger cause LHHD 3 
30.21870 
(0.0000***) 
Reject null hypothesis 
LHHY does not granger cause LDSCY 3 
10.92228 
(0.0122***) 
Reject null hypothesis 
LHHY does not granger cause LHHdY 3 
7.079842 
(0.0694***) 
Reject null hypothesis 
Wald Chi-Square tests reported with respect to short run change. 
Values in parentheses, ‘()’ are the probability of rejection of Granger non-causality 
**,***, indicates statistically significant at 10% and 5% respectively. 
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Conclusively in the short run tests, it is evident 
that the household’s disposable income was now a 
major determinant of the household’s affordability of 
debt. There is a uni-directional granger causality 
relationship between the household’s disposable 
income (LHHY) to debt service coverage to 
disposable income ratio (LDSCY), Household debt to 
income ratio (LHHdY) and household debt in the 
Post-NCA period. In the Pre-NCA period household 
disposable income (LHHY) does not have any short 
run causality relationship with debt service coverage 
to disposable income ratio (LDSCY) and household 
debt to disposable income (LHHdY). This implies an 
insistence on household disposable income being the 
determining factor in granting debt to households in 
the Post-NCA period and non-insistence on the same 
in the Pre-NCA period. 
In Table 7 the VECM based long-run causality 
tests with respect to equation 7 to 10 are presented. 
The analysis ascertains the existence of long run 
relationships between household debts (LHHD) to 
debt service coverage to disposable income (LDSCY) 
in the Pre-NCA period. The ECTt-1 for this long-run 
relationship is significant at 5% level. However, in 
the same period, the analysis of the movement of debt 
service coverage to disposable income ratio (DSCY) 
towards household debts indicates that there is no 
long run relationship. The analysis also in the same 
period indicates significant bi-directional long run 
relationship between household debt (LHHD) and 
household debt to income ratio (LHHdY). There is no 
significant long run relationship between household 
debt (LHHD) and household disposable income 
(LHHY). The implication of this relationship is to 
prove the relaxed credit granting conditions in the 
Pre-NCA period were the bi-directional long-run 
relationship between household debt (LHHD) and 
household debt to disposable income ratio (LHHdY) 
indicate that having more debt was not a factor in 
reducing or increasing once disposable income. This 
is also confirmed by the non-existence of long run 
relationship between household debt (LHHD) and 
disposable income (LHHY) in both directions, 
insisting that level of debt and disposable income a 
household had was not a limiting factor in getting 
more debt in the long run.  
 
Table 7. Long run Estimates (Pre NCA and Post NCA periods) 
 
Pre-NCA Period 
Null Hypothesis Number of lags ECTt-1 Decision 
LHHD does not granger cause LDSCY 4 
-0.000349*** 
(0.0248) 
Reject null hypothesis 
LDSCY  does not granger cause LHHD 4 
-0.039451 
(0.4108 
Do not reject null hypothesis 
LHHD  does not granger cause LHHdY 4 
0.003668*** 
(0.0052) 
Reject null hypothesis 
LHHdY  does not granger cause LHHD 4 
-0.088675*** 
(0.0052) 
Reject null hypothesis 
LHHD does not granger cause LHHY 4 
-0.025878*** 
(0.0192) 
Do not reject null hypothesis 
LHHY does not granger cause LHHD 4 
-0.001691 
(0.9553) 
Do not reject null hypothesis 
Post NCA period 
Null Hypothesis Number of lags ECTt-1 Decision 
LHHD does not granger cause LDSCY 3 
-0.013468 
(0.2102) 
Do not reject null hypothesis 
LDSCY  does not granger cause LHHD 3 
-0.333154*** 
(0.0004) 
Reject null hypothesis 
LHHD  does not granger cause LHHdY 3 
-0.080517*** 
(0.0023) 
Reject null hypothesis 
LHHdY  does not granger cause LHHD 3 
-0.305935*** 
(0.0213) 
Reject null hypothesis 
LHHD does not granger cause LHHY 3 
-0.262896*** 
(0.0001) 
Reject Null hypothesis 
LHHY does not granger cause LHHD 3 
-0.273190 
(0.4250) 
Do not reject null hypothesis 
 
Wald Chi-Square tests reported with respect to short run change. 
Values in parentheses, ‘()’ are the probability of rejection of Granger non-causality 
***, indicates statistically significant at 10% and 5% respectively. 
 
In Table 7b the results of the analysis of the 
long run relationships between the variables under 
study in the Post-NCA period is presented. There is a 
uni-directional long run relationship from debt 
service coverage to income ratio LDSCY) to 
household debt and no relationship as household debt 
(LHHD) moves towards debt service coverage to 
disposable income ratio (LDSCY). This result is 
Journal of Governance and Regulation / Volume 3, Issue 4, 2014, Continued - 2 
 
 
171 
opposite of the same relationship in the Pre-NCA 
period. The implication is that in the Post-NCA 
period the debt service coverage to disposable income 
(LDSCY) determines the household debt (LHHD) in 
the long run which is an opposite in the Pre-NCA 
period were debt service coverage to disposable 
income had no impact on the household debt in the 
long run.  
A bi-directional long run relationship between 
household debt (LHHD) and household debt to 
disposable income ratio (LHHdY) indicates that 
household debt would impact the amount of 
disposable income the household would be left with 
after taking debt. More so the household debt as 
percentage of disposable income would determine the 
amount of debt the household would take on. There is 
however a significant uni-direction causality of 
household debt (HHD) to disposable income (HHY) 
whilst there is no significant long run relationship as 
disposable income moves towards household debt. 
The implication is that income in the Post-NCA 
period, in the long run, is no longer an absolute 
determinant of the amount of debt a household could 
take on.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In summary, it is evident that the introduction of the 
National Credit Act managed to curtail reckless 
lending that was happening in the Pre-NCA period 
which was shown in the short run and long run results 
that the household income was not a major 
determinant of how much a household could get in 
debt. However in the Post-NCA period it was evident 
that the debt a household had was a major 
determinant in both the long run and short run. It is 
evident in this analysis that the National Credit has 
managed to stem reckless lending, however currently 
the unsecured lending book for the South African 
banks has increased as banks seek to circumvent the 
stringent lending criteria laid out in the NCA. Thus 
future research should seek to investigate the impact 
of unsecured lending and how innovative credit 
lending has circumvented the stringent lending 
regulations in NCA. More so the Credit Regulators 
should look into strengthening the NCA to cover 
these new innovative lending products that seek to 
circumvent the NCA strict granting procedures. 
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